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Abstract
Hinged on the quest for quality financial information, this study examined 
the influence of audit quality on restricting the incidence of accrual-based 
earnings management among 30 quoted non-financial firms in Nigeria, an 
emerging country which provides a rich institutional background and cultural 
setting different from developed nations. Secondary data were gathered from 
annual reports and audited financial statements for 11 years from 2008-2018. 
These firms were selected using stratified sampling technique. Thereafter, 
panel ordinary least square technique was used to estimate specified model 
for the study. While the descriptive statistics revealed the absence of accrual-
based manipulation of earnings among quoted non-financial firms in Nigeria, 
the multivariate fixed effects ordinary least square depicted that audit quality 
variables adopted are mutually and statistically significant in explaining 49 
percent changes in earnings management. Further, audit tenure and auditor 
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independence exhibited positive and significant relationship, while total 
assets as the control variable, displayed a negative and significant influence 
on earnings management. Surprisingly, the size of audit firm appeared 
positive but statistically insignificant. Consequently, the relevant authorities 
and policy makers should not only sustain but improve on the current 
practice of audit engagement partner and/or auditor switch after certain 
years of continuous engagement to enhance their independence and reduce 
client-auditor engagement periods to avoid familiarity threat. 
Keywords: Audit fees, auditor independence, auditor tenure, discretionary 
accruals, Nigeria. 
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Introduction
Among the many concepts in the accounting literature which have refused 
to quit the scene of research studies, and may not leave soon, earnings 
management is predominant. According to Yasser and Soliman (2018), 
earnings management is defined as “a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain” 
(p. 217). It assumed an alarming rate, throwing up a renewed interest in 
particular, following the financial crisis that rocked major and blue-chip 
entities like Enron, WorldCom, Pharmalat. There are renewed cases, such 
as Carillion and BHS in the United Kingdom (UK), IL & FS and Satyam 
Computer Services in India. In Nigeria, the Cadbury and Lever Brothers’ cases 
also come handy. Similarly, in 2010, the AAE Professional Services were 
indicted for non-compliance with statements of accounting standards during 
the audit of Alliance General Insurance Ltd/Alliance Life Assurance Plc by 
the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN). In the same vein, the 
accounts of Stanbic-IBTC for the year ended December 31, 2013 and 2014 
were once withdrawn owing to infractions by the FRCN while the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) had reasons to investigate the activities of 
Oando Plc. These incidences of earnings manipulation in emerging country 
like Nigeria provide excellent research motivation as to its existence and how 
it can be restricted, or at best, contained to barest minimum. These trends are 
worrisome, especially at they relates to the international professional practice 
of Big4 audit firms, dotted as custodian of excellent audit practice. This 
notion appears to be eroding. Consequently, this may be asymptomatic of yet 
another imminent global corporate failure which may be put at the door step 
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of managers’ opportunistic behaviour in manipulating reported earnings. 
The liberty with which managers and those charged with the governance of 
entities, in particular the corporate sectors who manipulate items of revenue 
and income in the financials is not only alarming, but unprecedented. This 
is simply a dishonest financial reporting. Principally, managers manipulate 
earnings for private gains. This is noticeable in the definition by Yasser and 
Soliman (2018) and cited earlier. Examples are deliberate understatement or 
overstatement of expenses in order to boost profits and be rewarded based 
on the fictitious profit or report losses in order to pay less taxes, respectively. 
Other reasons relate to the management’s opportunistic tendencies to 
manipulate earnings including avoiding reporting losses (Charoenwong & 
Jiraporn, 2009); meeting targeted EPS (Jordan, Clark & Hames, 2010) and 
decreasing income volatility (Hijazi & Al-Thuneibat, 2015).            
These preponderance of scandals have resulted in the mandate for higher 
audit quality as a key strategy, to checkmate the occurrence of earnings 
management. This is premised on previous empirical studies such as 
Sitanggang, Karbhari, Matemilola and Ariff (2019), Lopes (2018), Akintayo 
and Salman, (2018), Azibi, Azibi and Tondeur (2017), Alzoubi (2016), 
Nawaiseh (2016), Aliyu, Musa and Zachariah (2015) and Jordan, Clark 
and Hames (2010). Audit is an assurance engagement activity, which 
lends credibility to financial reports, prepared by management to render 
stewardship to owners of businesses. Consequent upon agency problem, 
rooted in contracting theory, between shareholders and managers, external 
auditors are appointed and engaged to detect material misstatements, 
thereby eliminating or at best minimising agency cost such as the earnings 
management. As provided in the International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 
No. 240,, ‘The Auditor’s Responsibility to Consider Fraud in an Audit of 
Financial Statements’ issued by the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB) of the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC), it is the primary responsibility of the management or those charged 
with the governance of the entity to ensure prevention and detection of fraud. 
This is usually done through establishment and maintenance of excellent 
internal controls.  Further, external auditors are as well saddled with the 
onerous task of planning and conducting the audit engagement in a bid to 
reducing audit risk to the barest minimum in the light of given circumstances. 
Audit risk connotes an inappropriate audit opinion which is usually contained 
in the final audit report. A material misstatement may be unintentional (error) 
or otherwise (fraud). Both are within the purview of the auditor to prevent 
and ultimately detect, if contained in financial statements. The risk of the 
latter is also specifically provided for in ISA 240, hence the auditor is urged 
to design, identify and assess the occurrence of such risk before (especially at 
the planning stage), during and after the field-work prior to signing the audit 
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report. Expectedly, auditors are to act with due care and utmost skills during 
their engagements, hence providing excellent audit quality which ultimately 
is transmitted into the financial reporting process and increases the level of 
quality of financial reports. According to Knechel (2016, p. 216), the audit 
quality is described as the twin-possibility for external auditors to detect 
a misnomer or an aberration during audit engagements and as well report 
such (if not corrected by clients) in his report. While the former is known as 
proficiency, the latter is objectivity. Clearly, the audit quality is desirable to 
achieve quality financial information.  
The Nigerian context provides a rich contextual background in studying 
the influence of audit quality on earnings management. Besides a few 
examples of incidence of accounting manipulations, the paucity of scholarly 
studies in this area is another justification. The few that are available are 
conducted along sectoral dimensions, for example, Mohammed & Abibakar, 
2018; Akintayo & Salman, 2018 and Olabisi, Agbatoogun & Akinrinlola, 
2017 were conducted in the banking industry; Alao & Gbolagade, 2019 
and Tyokoso and Tsegba (2015) were within the oil and gas industry. The 
continued dominance by Big4 audit firms in the Nigerian audit market 
alongside weak nature of her corporate governance mechanism coupled with 
little or no litigation risk against auditors are other motivations for this study. 
Against these backdrops and the specific need to investigate whether  the 
universality of quality of audit is correct as claimed overtly by United States 
of American market (Chen, Chen, Lobo & Wang, 2011), this study sought 
to examine the influence of audit quality on accrual earnings management 
among quoted non-financial firms in Nigeria.  Therefore, the findings from 
this study is of immense benefits to relevant authorities, such as the Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN), the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of Nigeria (ICAN), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) among others in drawing up regulations 
to improve and further strengthen the audit quality in particular, and the 
accounting profession in general. Given the introduction, this paper thus 
proceeds as follows; the second section discusses previous related empirical 
studies alongside the theoretical review. Meanwhile the methodology and 




Yasser and Soliman (2018, p. 217) viewed earnings management as the 
deliberate and or intentional behaviour of management to intervene in 
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financial reporting processes for private gain. This opportunistic behaviour 
of managers contradict their fiduciary position as entrenched in the laws 
and regulations guiding their appointments. While commenting on the 
broad nature of earnings management, Alzoubi (2016) likened the concept 
known as earnings management to a composite concept whose elements are 
composed of a whole range of managers’ ineptitude nature to use estimates 
and judgements in arriving at the value(s) in the accounts. Further, Healy & 
Wahlen (1999) cited in Abbadi, Hijazi and Al-rahahleh (2016) provided an 
encompassing definition of earnings management: 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment 
in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about 
the underlying economic performance of the company or 
to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers”. (p. 56).
The above definition is not only apt, but clearly indicates that management 
enjoys using their discretions. Such discretions may be used for and against 
the shareholders and other stakeholders but to the former’s benefits. In 
the course of preparing the accounts, the management makes judgments 
alongside estimates based on experience and information available to 
them. During this phase, the managers exhibit opportunistic behaviour on 
earnings using various methods and techniques. One way is accrual based 
earnings management. This connotes exercising discretion by making 
favourable judgements on choice(s) of accounting estimates. Manipulation 
of real transactions is another technique. According to Zgarni, Hlioui & 
Zehri (2012), the latter involves actual alteration of operating activities 
and decisions such as over-production, offering discounts to increase sales 
volume and others. However, the trio opine that accrual based manipulation 
is more risky and easily detectable by auditors; hence, the prevalent of real 
earnings among entities.    
        
Audit Quality
Knechel (2016, p. 216), defined the audit quality as the twin-possibility 
for external auditors to detect a misnomer or an aberration during audit 
engagements and as well report such (if not corrected by clients) in his report. 
While the ability of auditors to discover material misstatements is known as 
auditor expertise (also called auditor competence), auditor independence is 
used to describe the fearlessness for auditors to report such misstatements, 
through a qualified, disclaimer or adverse opinions, if not corrected. These 
two attributes of auditors are combined to produce the composite concept of 
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auditor quality. The auditors are seen and taken as the principal determinant 
of audit quality; hence, the rigorous nature of processes and procedures 
involved before being certified as practicing auditors. Further, Knechel 
(2016) cautioned the need to treat both attributes as dependent, rather than 
separate and independent or mutually exclusive construct. These traits are 
also combined to produce four possibilities with regard to the levels of audit 
quality, at least, in the non-regulated environment. These are (a) low auditor 
independence and auditor competence, (b) high auditor independence 
and auditor competence, (c) high auditor independence and low auditor 
competence, and (d) the low auditor independence and high auditor 
competence. He maintained that none of these are desirable, as they tend to 
destroy the accounting profession, hence there is the need for a re-defined 
regulation of audit quality to reflect the uniqueness of audit. While noting the 
unobservable nature of audit quality, previous studies have adopted different 
proxies in measuring the concept. Prominent measures are audit fees (Miko 
& Kamardin, 2015); auditor size (Alzoubi, 2016; Miko & Kamardin, 2015); 
auditor tenure (Nawaiseh, 2016; Miko & Kamardin, 2015). While these are 
treated as determinants of audit quality in audit literature, the conclusion 
is that they are measures of either dimensions of auditor independence or 
competence.       
  
Empirical Review: Evidence from Developed Nations
There are copious studies regarding audit quality and earnings management 
among developed nations. This appears to have slowed down recently. A 
few recent ones are reviewed hereinafter. Commencing with the study by 
Sitanggang et al. (2019) conducted among large manufacturing companies in 
United Kingdom for four years, between 2010 and 2013 using abnormal of 
operating cash flow abnormal production cost and real earning management 
index as proxies for earnings management. Hinged on the estimates as 
reported in the panel fixed effects, audit fees displayed negative and 
significant influence on abnormal operating cash flow, while it maintains 
a rather positive and significant association with abnormal production 
cost and real earnings management index. It provides evidence of limited 
association between audit quality and actual manipulation of reported 
earnings, maintaining the need for managers of entities to curb by themselves 
deliberate manipulations of earnings, rather than engaging any Big4 firms to 
assist which may lead to an erosion of the company’s value.  Further, using 
UK listed sampled companies across all sectors (excluding financial sector), 
El Guindy & Basuony (2018) also explored the impact of auditor tenure on 
earnings management alongside a dual objective of whether such relationship 
was moderated by similar accounting standards, as according to them, UK 
firms are allowed to report using UK-GAAPs or International Financial 
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Reporting Standards (IFRS). The empirical analysis from this study shows 
negative and significant relationship between auditor tenure and incidence of 
discretionary accruals which is expected and consistent with prior studies. 
In addition, this trend is consistent irrespective of the accounting standard 
under which UK firms present their reports.  
Lopes (2018) examined this relationship among 4,723 sampled non quoted 
firms in Portugal for a time dimension of three years (2013-2015). The 
findings arising from this study provide strong evidence as to the influence 
of audit quality on earnings management, explaining 24.3 percent (adjusted 
R2) of changes in behaviour of discretionary accruals. The audit firms’ size, 
one of the audit quality indicators, proxied with the usual Big4 versus non-
Big4 binary variables, which appear significant and negative, indicates a 
reduction in earnings manipulations as firms switch from the non-Big4 to 
Big4 professional accounting firms. The Big4 accounting firms constrain 
management tendencies to manipulate earnings. Further, Azibi, Azibi and 
Tondeur (2017) examined the influence of audit quality, proxied with auditor 
selection between Big4 and non-Big4, alongside institutional activism on 
the incidence of earnings management within the French context, pre- and 
post-Enron debacle. Adopting Kothari, et al.’s (2005) model, 188 French 
enterprises listed on SBF250 index were used as the sample, for six years 
from 2000 to 2007. Overall, the findings reveal the movement of adjusted R2 
from 2.92 percent (10.58% for mean of three-year estimation, 2000-2002) 
variations in the pre-enron era to 3.91 percent (11.44% for mean of four-year 
estimation, 2003-2006) variations in the earnings management as explained 
by the auditor choice and institutional activism. There were no significant 
differences in the magnitude of discretionary accruals reported by either 
Big4 or non-Big4 firms.
Similarly, Molik, Mir, Mclver and Bepari (2013) provided empirical evidence 
of Australian firms’ uncanny attitude to manipulate earnings, especially 
during the global financial crisis and show to what extent audit quality, 
proxied with Big4/non-Big4 dichotomy has constrained this behaviour. 
While adopting Jones and modified Jones models to estimate abnormal 
accrual among 149 unbalanced panel firms, for a period of 4 years, spanning 
2006 to 2009, it was discovered that Australian firms embarked on income 
decreasing earning manipulation strategies during the global financial crisis. 
Unfortunately, this was not sanctioned by Big4 firms, implying insignificant 
influence of audit quality on discretionary accruals. Further, Chi, Lisic and 
Pevzner (2011) provide plausible answers to pertinent question as to whether 
enhanced audit quality discourages entities from manipulating accruals, that 
is, accruals earnings management, rather encourages real manipulation of 
transactions. Consequently, the trio examine the effects of audit quality on 
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real earnings management. In addition to confirming the inverse relationship 
between audit quality and accruals manipulation, it also found that the 
expected outcome of managers switching to real manipulation of earnings 
in the presence of enhanced audit quality, proxied primarily with Big4/non-
Big4 professional firms and auditor tenure.   
Evidence from Developing Nations
Studies from developing and/or emerging countries largely reflect those 
of developed countries, especially in terms of methodology and findings. 
In the Egyptian context, Yasser and Soliman (2018) examined the effect 
of audit quality on earnings management among top 70 EGX100 listed 
firms for five years from 2011 to 2016. Like most studies, the study adopts 
the modified Jones’ model in computing the absolute value for abnormal 
accruals. Thereafter, multiple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) was adopted 
as the estimation technique. Overall, 8.4 percent of variations in earnings 
management were explained by measures of audit quality, including Big4, 
industry specialisation, auditor tenure, client size with leverage and operating 
cash flows as control variables. Of these, audit tenure and client size 
seem significant and also show the expected sign of positive and negative 
respectively. This connotes that the longer the auditor-client relationship, the 
greater the incidence of earnings manipulations by management.   
Almarayeh et al. (2020) consolidated past studies in Jordan by a renewed 
investigation into the association between two auditor characteristics, 
namely auditor size and audit fees as well as earnings management. With 
a final 251 firms/year observations, similar to past Jordanian studies, over a 
5-year period, the results depict no significant influence of these two proxies 
of audit quality and restriction on earnings manipulations in Jordan. Further, 
the results based upon a generalized least square regression (GLS) show a 
positive and significant influence of all control variables (firm size, growth 
and ROA), except leverage, though positive but insignificantly related to 
accrual earnings management. In addition, a relatively low value (18%) was 
reported as the adjusted R2 indicative that the totality of the explanatory 
variable explain only 18 percent differences in earnings management. Similar 
study by Alzoubi (2016) examines the effect of disclosure quality on the 
magnitude of earnings management among 86 industrial companies quoted 
on the Amman Stock Exchange for four years between 2007 and 2010. Using 
a GLS regression in order to surmount the heteroskedasticity problems of 
OLS, the findings from the study show disclosure quality exerting a negative 
influence on incidence of earning management, accounting for 45 percent 
variations therein, thereby improving the quality of financial reporting. Of 
note are the audit firm size (measured by Big4 versus non-Big4 dichotomy), 
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client’s size (natural log of total assets) and clients’ profitability (proxied with 
ROA). As expected, all displayed a negative and significant relationship with 
earnings management. Nawaiseh (2016) investigates the impact of external 
audit quality on earnings management among 13 listed banks for five years 
from 2006 to 2010. The study also lends credence to the association between 
audit quality and earnings management by Jordanian banks, accounting 
for 47.6 percent of variations thereof. Specific leading audit quality factors 
which turned out expected signs and also depict significant influence on 
discretionary accruals include audit tenure, audit fees (a measure of audit 
independence) and international auditing firm relationship. 
In addition, the trio of Ahmad, Suhara and Ilyas (2016) provide empirical 
evidence on the effect of audit quality on earnings management in Indonesia. 
Using a 420 firm-year observations comprising 105 quoted but non-regulated 
manufacturing firms over 4 years, from 2010 to 2013, and based on the 
modified Jones model, the study support the hypothesis of inverse relationship 
between audit quality and earnings management. In Indonesian case, the 
totality of audit quality factors, comprising of Big4, auditor specialization, 
clients’ size, leverage and operating cash flows accounted for 52 percent 
variations in earnings management. This is dissimilar to findings from the 
study of Habbash and Alghamdi (2016) conducted within the context of 337 
quoted non- financial Saudi Arabian firms, using a cross-sectional variation 
of the Kothari model to compute absolute value for discretionary accruals. 
Selected audit quality factors used in this study account for 9 percent of 
changes in discretionary accruals, with only audit opinion being negative and 
significant. This was in addition to firm size and operating cash flows that 
were control variables. 
Zuo and Guan (2014) also provide empirical evidence towards explaining the 
association between audit firm size and industry specialization on earnings 
management among 2,552 Chinese firms for 4 years spanning 2008-2011. 
Using the usual multiple OLS, their findings are largely consistent with 
recent studies, with the value for adjusted R2 being 90.75 percent. Larger 
chunk of changes in earnings management are being explained by audit 
quality factors, to include auditor size, auditor specialization and a host 
of 5 control variables. Zgarni, Hlioui and  Zehri (2012) provide evidence 
from 29 Tunisian quoted firms in investigating the duo influence of audit 
quality and implementation of the country’s new financial security law on 
earnings management for 11 years (2000-2010). Unlike many other studies, 
this study examined both manipulation of discretionary accruals and real 
activities inherent in sales, decrease in discretionary expenditures as well 
as overproduction. Using a panel OLS in estimating the model specified 
for the study, the results depict audit quality as being a major determinant 
40        
Malaysian Management Journal Vol. 24, July 2020 31-56  
of earnings management, with auditor specialization and Big4 linked with 
lower discretionary accruals but serve as catalyst for larger manipulations 
of real transactions. However, as documented, elongated tenure of auditors 
is not related to earnings manipulations. Initially, Al-Mousawi and Al-
Thuneibat (2011) had added their lot on relationship between audit quality 
and earning management activities among Jordanian firms prior to that of 
Alzoubi (2016) and Nawaiseh (2016). Using simple and multiple regression 
as well as ANOVA for comparison, Al-Mousawi and Al-Thuneibat (2011) 
had earlier confirm a negative relationship between audit quality and earnings 
management documenting a value far lower as adjusted R2 being 0.4 percent 
and 0.55 percent if importance and auditor size were added, with the latter 
being significant and negative. Using a relatively large dataset of 3,310 
Chinese firms, Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang (2011) had earlier investigated 
the effects of audit quality on the duo of earnings management and cost of 
capital among her state-owned enterprises and that which are not state-owned 
enterprises. The findings from this study disclaims the widely held belief of 
uniformity of audit quality and its impact in restricting earnings manipulation 
by managers of these enterprises, with occurrence being more prevalent 
among state-owned enterprises than otherwise. Further, the study reports a 
pseudo adjusted R2 of 28 percent, size of audit firm is however positive and 
significantly related to the manifestation of earnings management.    
Evidence from Nigeria
There are a few studies in Nigeria which have examined audit quality and 
incidence of earnings management by entities, which may have caused grim 
consequences. However, most of these were along sectoral dimensions, with 
a great number conducted within the context of the banking industry using 
quoted deposit money banks (Mohammed & Abibakar, 2018; Akintayo & 
Salman, 2018; Olabisi, Agbatoogun & Akinrinlola, 2017; Aliyu, Musa & 
Zachariah, 2015); oil and gas industry (Alao & Gbolagade, 2019; Tyokoso 
& Tsegba, 2015), among others. Though, not covered in this study, there 
are stand-alone studies investigating determinants of audit quality (Soyemi, 
Olabisi & Akintoye, 2017) as well as in relation to other concepts, such as 
internal audit attributes (Soyemi, Ashogbon & Asaolu, 2016), corporate 
governance (Soyemi, 2020; Abbadi, Hijazi & Al-Rahehleh, 2016).
   
Although, the trio of studies by Mohammed and Abibakar (2018), Akintayo 
and Salman (2018) and Olabisi, Agbatoogun and Akinrinlola (2017) are 
similar in many respects, there are obvious differences. Mohammed and 
Abibakar (2018) explores the association between related-party transactions 
and off-balance sheet activities on earnings quality (using residuals inherent 
in the provision for loan losses) using a panel data set of 40 composed of 
10 listed deposit money banks over a 4-year period beginning from the 
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year of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption, that 
is, 2011 to 2014. While related-party transactions display positive and 
significant influence, off-balance sheet item variable depict a negative but 
insignificant relationship with earnings quality with an adjusted coefficient 
of determination (R2) of approximately 19%. Expanding the scope further, 
Akintayo and Salman (2018) in their own study examine audit quality, as 
well as corporate governance, as it affects earnings management among all 
15 quoted banks for 10 years, between 2006 and 2015, thereby adopting 
a census approach. A low incidence of earnings manipulation (mean of 
discretionary accruals being 14%) was confirmed. The pooled OLS estimates 
was considered appropriate returning an adjusted R2 of 63 percent being total 
variations accounted for by audit tenure, audit fees, board independence, 
client size and leverage in discretionary accruals. Audit quality measures 
were seen to have behaved expectedly in tune with a priori expectation 
by being negatively (audit tenure) and positively (audit fees) significant 
respectively. In the case of Olabisi, Agbatoogun and Akinrinlola (2017), six 
quoted banks, randomly selected for 10 years, from 2005 to 2014, were used 
as the sample size, thereby returning 60 firm-year observations. Unlike that 
of Akintayo and Salman, (2018), Beaver and Engel model was adopted to 
estimate the abnormal accruals inherent in the loan loss provisioning. Overall, 
and hinging on the random effects estimates, only 10 percent of variations 
were accounted for by joint audit, audit tenure, auditor specialization and 
audit independence, with joint audit (positive and significant), auditor 
specialisation (negative and significant) and audit independence (positive 
and significant) being effective audit quality factors which constrain the 
incidence of earning management. 
Further and chuckled by financial manipulations associated with the Nigerian 
oil industry, Tyokoso and Tsegba (2015) investigate the impact of audit 
quality on earnings management of 8 (out of a total population of 10) listed 
oil marketing companies, for 10 years, spanning from 2004-2013. The study 
adopts the common modified Jones model to estimate abnormal accruals with 
proxies of audit quality to include audit firm size, auditor specialization and 
audit tenure, with client size and CFO as control variables. They collectively 
contributed 14.3 percent changes in discretionary accruals with audit tenure 
displaying negative and significant influence, in addition to the two control 
variables showing positive and significant relationship, as well. In addition, 
Okolie (2014) offer experimental proof, as to the specific influence of auditor 
tenure and independence in constraining management uncanny attitude in 
manipulating earnings. The sample size includes 57 quoted firms for 6 years, 
between 2006 and 2011, that is, 342 firm year dataset. Overall, the value 
for adjusted R2 is 14.6 percent with both measures of audit quality being 
significant factors in curtailing the incidence of earnings manipulations 
among entities in Nigeria.
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Theoretical Framework
The agency and stakeholder theories constitute the theoretical framework 
upon which this study is based. It was propounded by Jensen & Meckling 
(1976)  cited in Hosseini and Tareq (2016) connotes managers as agents of the 
shareholders, who are the prima facie owners of the business. Consequently, 
managers who are responsible for the management of affairs of entities are 
better informed of the business operations, hence may be tempted to act in 
a manner that is incoherent with that of owners. This is agency problem, 
hinged upon information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. 
To surmount this problem, owners appoint independent external auditors 
to lend credibility on the stewardship report rendered by management. 
Closely associated with the agency theory is stakeholder theory propounded 
by Freeman (1984) cited in Tyokoso and Tsegba (2015). Originally coined 
as stakeholder theory of organization management and business ethics, it 
addresses morals and values in managing entities. It expands those whose 
interests are as well to be protected to include general public and society 
at large. Consequently, rather than concentrating on shareholders alone, 
values should also be created and shared among other stakeholders such as 
customers, employees, suppliers, etc.     
Methodology
The data for this study were essentially gathered from financial statements 
of 30 quoted non-financial firms (see appendix), selected through stratified 
sampling technique, from a total population of 105 quoted firms covering 11 
years from 2008 – 2018 (Nigerian Stock Exchange Factbook, 2018). This 
represents approximately 29% and translates to 330 firm-year observations 
(33quoted non-financial firms multiply by 11years). The sample size is 
considered adequate and appropriate for any parametric analytical tool, 
having satisfied the n ≥ 30 threshold. Further, the small sample size is 
typical of developing countries, such as Nigeria, where there is a significant 
paucity of data for research purposes. Besides, the sample size is relatively 
over that which is derived while applying the following statistical formular 
(Al-Mousawi & Al-Thuneibat, 2011). It is stated in Equation (1)
  n = 0.25/{(0.25/N) + (A2/E2}                  (1)
 
 where: n = sample size
  A = error level used which is equal to 10%
  E = tabulated value for a 95% confidence interval   
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Measurement of Variables
Dependent Variable - Earnings Management
The dependent variable is earnings management. The pooled cross-sectional 
modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) cited in Tyokoso et 
al. (2017) was adopted to obtain a proxy for discretionary accruals. According 
to extant literature, modified Jones model has been adjudged as the most 
authoritative model of estimating discretionary accruals, hence its common 
usage among varying studies such as Lopes (2018) and Alzoubi (2016). 
Overall, discretionary accruals are derived from deducting non-discretionary 
accruals from total accruals; hence the usual starting point is disintegrating 
total accruals into discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals, that 
is:
TAit  = DAit + NDAit        (2)
According to modified Jones model, TAit is computed using Equation (3)
 TAit/Ait-1      = β1(1/Ait-1) + β2(∆REVit - ∆RECit /Ait-1) 
                                        + β3(PPEit/Ait-1) + eit        (3)
where: Ait-1 = total assets lagged by a year 
∆REVit  = changes in operating revenue
  ∆RECit = changes in net receivables
 PPEit  = gross value for plant, property and equipment
Similarly, eit  = NDAit is also derived for Equation (4)
 NDAit/Ait-1 = β1(1/Ait-1) + β2(∆REVit /Ait-1) + β3(PPEit/Ait-1) + eit    (4)
Therefore, deducting Equation (4) from (3) gives discretionary accruals, 
DAit as follows:
DAit  = TAit/Ait-1 - NDAit/Ait-1       (5)
However, it is noteworthy that absolute values for discretionary accruals were 
utilized because either positive or negative, they both represent opportunistic 
earnings management behavior by management. 
Independent Variables 
Table 1 describes proxies under consideration in this study alongside their 
measurement and sources from previous works.
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Table 1 
Description and Measurement of Independent Variables 
Variables/ Label Measurement Predicted Sign Source(s)
Firm size (FZ) Big4(1) vs Non-
Big4(0)
- Almarayeh et al. (2020), 
Lopes (2018), Alzoubi 
(2016), Al-Mousawi and 
Al-Thuneibat (2011). 
Audit tenure (AT) Length of auditor-
client relationship
+ Nawaiseh (2016), 
Okolie (2014), Zgarni, 




Natural log of 
audit fees charged 
by auditor
-/+ Almarayeh et al. (2020), 
Nawaiseh (2016), 
Okolie (2014), Wooten 
(2003), Craswel et al. 
(2002).
Control Variables
Return on Assets 
(ROA)
Net income 
divided by total 
assets
- Lopes (2018), Alzoubi 
(2016), Zgarni et al. 
(2012).
Total Assets (TA) Natural log of total 
assets
- Mohammed & Abibakar 
(2018), Lopes (2018), 
Alzoubi (2016), Zgarni 
et al. (2012).
Source: Authors’ Compilation (2020)
Model Specification and Estimation Techniques
The model for the study is as specified below:
                    (6)
where:    EM = Earnings Management 
  FZ  = Audit Firm Size 
  AT = Auditor’s Tenure 
  AI  = Auditors’ Independence
 ROA = Return on Asset  
 TA  = Total Asset
   e = Error Term
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽3𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽5𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
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The panel ordinary least square (OLS) regression is the estimating technique 
adopted in this study. Initially, the above equation assumes a simplest 
approach by running a pooled regression. This was later followed by the 
fixed effects and random effects Models estimation in order to account for 
the deficiency of oversimplification and overcome the highly restricted 
assumptions associated with pooled regression.
Results 
The results of the analysis are presented in this section. It is divided into two 
major sub-divisions namely: descriptive statistics and empirical regression 
analysis. The descriptive analysis describes basic attributes with the aid of 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values. The correlation 
test was employed to examine relationships among selected variables while 
the empirical regression analysis revealed the effect of audit quality on 
earnings management using the commonly used panel regression approach. 
Descriptive Statistics
This section describes the basic statistical features of chosen variables in 
this study. Table 2 presents the summary of the descriptive statistics, that is, 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for the variables 
used in this study. 
Table 2 reveals that discretionary accruals have a minimum and maximum 
value of -13.38 and 0.71, respectively with a mean value of 0.00 and standard 
deviation at 0.75. This connotes a negligible presence of accrual earnings 
management with a consequential skew towards negative, showing the 
prevalent of income decreasing (negative discretionary accruals) earnings 
manipulation type among selected non-financial firms; hence reported 
earnings is associated with greater level of accounting conservatism 
practices. In comparison, the mean value appears to be consistent with that 
documented by Okolie (2014) being -0.00 (0%), which is indicative of a very 
low level of earning manipulations among quoted non-financial firms, as 
compared to 0.1492 (15%) with deposit money banks in Nigeria as revealed 
by Akintayo and Salman (2018). However, higher values were reported in 
developing economies of Jordan being -0.415 (42%) by Nawaiseh (2016) 
and Saudi Arabia being -0.103 (10%) by Habbash & Alghamdi (2016). This 
is plausible as banks tend to manipulate earnings than non-financial firms.
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Table 2 
Summary Statistics of Variables Used
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DA 0.00 0.75 -13.38 0.71
FZ 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00
AT 3.63 2.24 1.00 10.00
AI 26778.05 43703.36 1000.00 366672.00
ROA 0.055 0.113 -0.143 0.38
TA 55000000.00 212000000.00 270036.00 3620000000.00
However, FZ, a proxy for Big4/non-Big4, is seen to have an average value 
of 0.68 with a standard deviation of 0.47 and a minimum and maximum 
value of 0.00 to 1.00. By implication, 68 percent of total sample size (20 
firms), were audited by Big4 while 32 percent (representing 10 firms) 
engaged the non-Big4 accounting firms. This is a further affirmation as to 
the dominance of the Big4 audit firms in Nigeria (Soyemi, 2015; Soyemi, 
2020). This is unlike the Tunisian context where 31 percent of total sampled 
firms engaged the Big4 while 69 percent engaged the non-Big4 firms. The 
mean and standard deviation value of AT are depicted as 3.63 and 2.24 
respectively. Its minimum and maximum value ranges from 1.00 to 10.00. 
This indicates that auditors were engaged on an average of approximately 
four years. This is within the time limit allowed by the corporate governance 
code in Nigeria. Furthermore, AI, proxied with audit fees, shows a mean 
value of approximately N27 million with a standard deviation of 43703.36, 
minimum and maximum value of N1million and N367 million respectively. 
In addition, ROA reveals 0.38 as its maximum and -0.143 as its minimum 
with a standard deviation value of 0.113 and a mean value of 0.055 denoting 
that most selected firms are less profitable. Finally, TA is revealed to have a 
minimum value of N270 million and N3 trillion as its maximum value with a 
standard error of 212000000 and mean value of N550 million.
Correlation Analysis
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for the selected variables in this 
study. This is important in  examining the level of associations between 
dependent variable and independent variables on one hand, and identify the 
multicollinearity tendencies, if any, among independent variables, on the 
other hand. This is a condition precedent to estimating the model specified 
for this study using pooled ordinary least square (OLS).
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Table 3
Correlation Matrix amongst Variables Used
DAC FZ AT AI ROA TA
DA 1.000
FZ 0.0942* 1.0000
AT 0.0025 0.0071 1.0000
AI 0.0448 0.3011*** 0.0998* 1.0000
ROA -0.0054 -0.0382 0.0648 0.0231 1.0000
TA -0.1638*** 0.4408*** 0.1368** 0.5839*** 0.0196 1.0000
*** = 1%, **=5% and *=10% levels of significance
Generally, the correlations among the variables are weak with few ones that 
are significant at 1 percent significance level. All the explanatory variables 
are positively correlated with DA except for the control variables, ROA and 
TA which are negative. However, though TA is negatively correlated with 
DA, almost all of its values are significant. The correlation between DA and 
FZ is seen to be weak and significant at 10 percent level of significance with 
p-value of 0.0874 while the correlation between DA and AT is positive, it is 
also seen to be weak and insignificant. AI and DA are also seen to exhibit a 
positive and weak correlation, though insignificant, while ROA represents a 
negative correlation with DA and is still not significant. However, TA has 
a negative and weak correlation with DA; it is also seen to be statistically 
significant at 1 percent with a probability value of 0.0028. Conversely, other 
relationships which are revealed to be statistically significant are AI with FZ 
and AT at 1 percent and 10 percent level of significance while correlations 
of TA with FZ, AT and AI are at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels 
of significance respectively. All these correlations are seen to be positive and 
weak, thereby posing no threat of multicollinearity.
The Variance Inflation Factor 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was piloted to further confirm the 
absence of multicollinearity. Table 4 shows the values for the test, alongside 
its inverse. 
Judging from the result as shown in Table 4, All VIF are less than 10 so, 
these indicate that the variables under consideration are not perfect linear 
combination of each other.
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Table 4 




























TA  -16.1357 *** (3.0376)  -23.8319*** (3.6826)  -104.6592*** (6.1801)




R-squared 0.089 0.284 0.494
Adj R-squared 0.0745
Wald chi2(5)  
43.67 
(0.0000)











Note: *** = 1%, **=5% and *=10% levels of significance
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Table 5 depicts the results of the estimated coefficients of audit quality and 
firm characteristics indicators using pooled (OLS), random effects model 
(RE) and fixed effects model (FE). In selecting the appropriate model, the 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test was done to compare 
pooled and random effect model while Hausman test was deployed to choose 
between random effects and fixed effects model. In this study, it is observed 
that fixed effects model is appropriate for this study. Specifically, the LM 
2.16 (p = 0.0708) and Hausman test 286.72 (0.0000) statistics shown in 
the lower portion of Table 5 show preference for fixed effects model. This 
confirms the applicability of the fixed effects model for this study.  
Interpreting the selected fixed effects model in the fourth column of Table 5, 
F-statistics values of 57.39 (p = 0.000) indicate that the selected explanatory 
variables are jointly and statistically significant in explaining variations in 
earnings management. Specifically, the value of R-squared, being 0.494, 
shows that the explanatory variables jointly explain about 49 percent of 
changes in earnings management, proxied with discretionary accruals. 
Furthermore, audit tenure exhibits a positive and significant (at 1% with a 
p-value of 0.001) influence on discretional accrual, implying that additional 
one year in auditor tenure will cause discretional accrual to change by five 
units. Correspondingly, AI which is the variable for auditor’s independent, 
also maintains a positive and significant relationship (at 1% with a p-value of 
0.000) with discretional accrual.  Lastly, the result shows that the coefficients 
of Return on Assets (ROA) and Log of Total Assets (LTASS) have negative 
coefficients, denoting a negative relationship of the two control variables 
with discretional accrual, with only TA displaying a negative and significant 
relationship with DA at 1% level of significance.
Diagnostics Tests 
Table 6 presents Jarque-Bera normality test and White’s test for 
heteroscedasticity as diagnostics for analysis conducted for this study. 
Table 6 
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The Jarque-Bera test statistic is employed to check whether the residual 
(error term) of the estimated model when discretionary accrual is regressed 
on audit quality indicators and control variables is normally distributed. As 
shown in Table 6, the J-B test statistics (1.787) and its associated p-value 
(0.409) are statistically insignificant. These strongly suggest the acceptance 
of the null hypothesis of normality, thus concluding that the residual of 
the estimated regression model is normally distributed. Furthermore, 
White’s test approach was adopted for heteroscedasticity test. Again, the 
test statistics value of 13.764 and the corresponding P-value of 0.101 are 
statistically insignificant within the 1 percent and 10 percent alpha levels. 
These strongly failed to reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. 
Therefore, the study concludes that the residual of the estimated regression 
model has constant variance that is homoscedastic in nature. Alternatively, 
the study concludes that the residual of the estimated regression model is free 
from heteroscedasticity problem.
Discussion
While findings from this study are analogous to that of past studies, 
inconsistencies were noticed as well. Commencing with the coefficient 
of determination, that is, the adjusted R2 (49%) obtained from this study, 
it mirrors that which was obtained in the studies by Alzoubi (2016) – 45 
percent and Nawaiseh (2016) – 48 percent in Jordan and lower (13.4%) in 
the case of Okolie (2014) but relatively higher (63%) for that conducted by 
Akintayo and Salmon (2018) in the Nigerian banking sector. 
Further and turning to individual measures of audit quality in relation to 
preventing the occurrence of earnings manipulation by management, client-
auditor tenure displayed positive and significant association with earning 
management. This implies that the longer the tenure of external auditors, 
the greater the incidence of earnings manipulation by mangers without 
being detected by them. This is expected as familiarity sets in thereby 
creating threats to audit quality. This result complies with that of Yasser 
and Soliman (2018), Zgarni, Hlioui and Zehri (2012), but contradicts that 
of Piot and Janin (2005), Okolie (2014), Nawaiseh (2016), Tyokoso et al. 
(2017) and Akintayo and Salman (2018). Similarly, findings around auditor 
independence, especially proxied with audit fees, as used in this study, appear 
mixed as both positive and negative association are justified and explained 
appropriately. Here, auditor independent being positive and statistically 
significant indicates a direct association with earnings management, implying 
that higher fees, especially from one client, impair auditor independence, 
hence unable to detect material misstatements, thereby eroding audit quality. 
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Simply put, the more dependent external auditors on the clients, the less 
the audit quality. This is consistent with studies by Jayeola, Agbatoogun 
and Akinrinlola (2017) but in contrary with Nawaiseh (2016). This is as 
documented in the study by Habbash and Alghamdi (2016). Surprisingly 
but expectedly, firm size, measured with Big4/non-Big4 dichotomy, displays 
positive but insignificant relationship with discretional accrual. This is 
consistent with other Nigerian studies Okolie, 2014; Akintayo & Salman, 
2018; and Jayeola et al., 2017) and a host of results from developing nations 
of Jordan (Almarayeh, Aibar-Guzmán, & Abdullatif, 2020); Tunisia (Zgarni 
et al., 2012) with real earnings management]; [Chen, Chen, Lobo, & Wang 
(2011)] and developed countries of Australia (Molik et al., 2013) during the 
global financial crisis and France (Piot & Janin,  2005). On the other hands, 
it contradicts studies from emerging countries such as Indonesia (Ahmad 
et al., 2016), Jordan (Alzoubi, 2016) and Tunisia (Zgarni et al., 2012) with 
accrual earnings management] as well as developed nations of USA (Jordan 
et al., 2016) and Portugal (Lopes, 2018). In Nigeria, the consistency may 
also be contextual-related being a country with low investor protection, 
evolving corporate governance and relatively absence of court cases, that 
is, low litigation risk against external auditors, thereby tacitly allowing for 
lower accounting conservatism practices but greater earnings manipulation 
by management. In addition, this may be connected with the on-going uproar 
against the perceived impression of equating Big4 professional firms with 
high quality. This is evidenced in the wave of scandals involving the Big4 
across the globe, especially in the US, UK, Germany and India.
That clients’ size displayed a negative and significant relationship with 
earning management connotes that the larger the size of entities, the less 
managers are allowed to display opportunistic behaviour by deliberately 
manipulating earnings. Relating this to Nigerian context where ownership 
structure of quoted non-financial firms are concentrated, it then means that 
investors (largely institutional) exhibit excellent oversight functions over 
managers entrusted with firms’ resources. No doubt, this is reinforcement 
to external audit activities towards the detection of material misstatements 
in the financial statements. This is consistent with studies by Mohammed 
& Abibakar (2018), Yasser & Soliman (2018), Habbash & Alghamdi 
(2016) and Lobo & Zhou (2006). In addition, it is also a tacit support to the 
proposition by Watts and& Zimmerman (1986) cited  in Piot & Janin (2005) 
as to the propensity of management of large firms to engage more in income-
decreasing in order to avoid partisan pressure. However, this finding negate 
that of Zuo & Guan (2014) who in addition to others, reported a positive and 
significant association between the size of the firm and incidence of earnings 
management in China.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
This paper seeks to contribute to the on-going debate on the influence of audit 
quality on constraining managers’ opportunistic behaviour in reporting earnings 
correctly. The findings emanating from this study clearly provide empirical 
evidence that the audit quality will deter the management’s tendencies to 
stage-manage report earnings. No doubt, the elongated auditor tenure creates 
the conflict of interest and undue familiarity, thereby culminating in auditor 
dependent, leading to low auditor quality. This is irrespective of auditor type. 
It is recommended that policies, guidelines and principles to deter undue 
auditor term elongation, coupled with auditor independence should be further 
strengthened by appropriate authorities, as these have the propensities to hinder 
earnings manipulations by Nigerian firms. There are provisions in the code of 
conduct for professional members issued by IFAC, and adopted by members 
of the professional bodies, including the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of Nigeria (ICAN). The current practice of audit engagement partner and/
or auditor switch after certain years of continuous engagement should be 
sustained by relevant authorities and policy makers in order to avoid an erosion 
of auditor independence, thereby causing a reduction in the audit quality. 
While this study may have contributed significantly to extant literatures by 
providing plausible explanations as to audit quality and earnings management 
in emerging country like Nigeria, there are a few limitations, hence findings 
therein may be subject to these, which may also be indicative of direction 
for future researchers. The absence of accrual earnings manipulation among 
studied Nigerian firms may be a suggestive of tacit diversion to engagement 
of other earnings management strategies such as real manipulation of actual 
transactions, as a result of the external auditors’ skills to uncover them. This 
is coupled with the use of signed discretionary accruals rather than absolute 
earnings management (both income increasing and decreasing discretionary 
accruals). Further, the twin adoption of a relatively small but adequate sample 
size (due to the availability of data but comprises highly capitalised quoted 
firms) and the exclusion of quoted financial firms may also create apparent 
limitations which future research may address.      
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Appendix
Companies that Participated in the study and their Sectors
S/N COMPANIES INDUSTRY/SECTOR
1 Livestock feeds Agriculture
2 Okomu Agriculture
3 Vitafoam Conglomerate
4 National Salt Company Conglomerate
5 Dangote Flour Mills Conglomerate
6 Dangote Sugar Conglomerate
7 Flour Mills Conglomerate
8 AG Leventis Conglomerate
9 UACN Conglomerate
10 Guiness Consumer Goods
11 Nigerian Breweries Consumer Goods
12 Unilever Consumer Goods




17 May & Baker Healthcare
18 NCR ICT
19 Beta Glass Industrial Goods
20 Cutix Industrial Goods
21 DN Meyer Industrial Goods
22 Berger Paints Industrial Goods
23 BOC Gases Natural Resources
24 Trans Nationwide Express Services
25 Red Star Services
26 Chams Services
27 Tantalizers Services
28 Ikeja Hotel Services
29 Studio Press Services
30 NAHCO Services
